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Abstract—IoT devices and sensors have been utilized in a co-
operative manner to enable the concept of a smart environment.
In these smart settings, abundant data is generated as a result
of the interactions between devices and users’ day-to-day ac-
tivities. Such data contain valuable forensic information about
events and actions occurring inside the smart environment and,
if analyzed, may help hold those violating security policies
accountable. Nonetheless, current smart app programming
platforms do not provide any digital forensics capability to
identify, trace, store, and analyze the IoT data. To overcome
this limitation, we introduce IoTDots, a novel digital forensic
framework for a smart environment such as smart homes and
smart offices. IoTDots has two main components: IoTDots-
Modifier and IoTDots-Analyzer. At compile time, IoTDots-
Modifier performs the source code analysis of smart apps,
detects forensically-relevant information, and automatically
insert tracing logs. Then, at runtime, the logs are stored into a
IoTDots database. Later, in the event of a forensic investigation,
the IoTDots-Analyzer applies data processing and machine
learning techniques to extract valuable and usable forensic
information from the devices’ activity. In order to test the
performance of IoTDots, we tested IoTDots in a realistic smart
office environment with a total of 22 devices and sensors.
Also, we considered 10 different cases of forensic activities
and behaviors from users, apps, and devices. The evaluation
results show that IoTDots can achieve, on average, over 98%
of accuracy on detecting user activities and over 96% accuracy
on detecting the behavior of users, devices, and apps in a
smart environment. Finally, IoTDots performance yields no
overhead to the smart devices and very minimal overhead
to the cloud server. To the best of our knowledge, IoTDots
is the first lightweight forensic solution for IoT devices that
combines the collection of the forensically-relevant data from
a smart environment and the analysis of such data using
data processing and machine learning techniques for forensic
purposes. Finally, we have made the IoTDots-Modifier available
online for the community.
Keywords—Digital forensics, Internet of Things, source code
analysis, logging.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Internet of Things (IoT) has quickly evolved as
the network of Internet-enabled physical devices. The IoT
devices communicate with each other and interact with the
users’ day-to-day activities through sensors. These capabil-
ities have also enabled the concept of a smart environment.
Such an environment improves the quality of the life of the
people while handling a new set of data previously untapped.
For instance, smart offices can be equipped with a set of
state-of-the-art gadgets like smart lights, smart surveillance
cameras, smart smoke detectors, presence sensors, and smart
thermostats, all controlled by a central hub. In such a setup,
the presence sensor can detect users and trigger the cameras
to start recording while turning on the lights. At the same
time, the smart thermostat can become active and start
lowering the room temperature. In this example, the smart
environment has control and gets feedback from the users’
activities to change the general state of the surroundings
based on (1) what the users do, (2) the smart environment
setup policies, and (3) the state of the devices.
Indeed, the interactions between devices and users in a
smart environment generate data with tremendous forensic
value. For instance, in the smart office setup previously
described, the changes in the presence sensor’s state may
indicate the existence of individuals inside the smart office
during unauthorized hours. Further, the smart environment
data can give insights about the exact location of abrupt
spikes in temperature values or the presence of smoke
happening right before a fire incident.
Nonetheless, current IoT solutions do not provide any
means for forensic analysis. In general, the limitation of
available computing resources in the majority of the smart
devices and the unique cloud-based architecture of IoT
makes it very challenging to store data inside the devices for
forensic purposes. Indeed, the most popular IoT program-
ming platforms (e.g., Samsung SmartThings, openHab, etc.)
do not provide any means to have access and indefinitely
store data in the cloud. Previous works have used the idea
of logging to save data from smart apps and devices for
further analysis of data provenance. For instance, in [1], the
authors propose an instrumental platform-centric approach
that logs activities from smart apps for data provenance. In
that work, however, the analysis considered the relationship
between devices, users, and smart apps while assuming
device integrity. This approach, while valid and useful,
overlook the problem of tampered devices [2] that can
cause the abnormal behavior of the smart environment.
Without this analysis, the IoT forensic investigation would
ignore additional threats coming from the compromised
devices [3], [4]. These threats can modify the state of the
smart environment by poisoning the forensic data or by
leaking sensitive information that attackers can use to bypass
the security policies of the smart environment and gain
access, for instance, to restricted areas. In this paper, we
introduce IoTDots, a novel digital forensic framework for
smart environments. IoTDots has two main components:
IoTDots-Modifier (ITM) and IoTDots-Analyzer (ITA). The
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ITM analyzes smart applications looking for forensically-
relevant information inside the apps. Then, the smart apps
are modified by inserting specific logs that will send the
forensic data to the IoTDots Logs Database (ITLD) at
runtime. Later, in a case of a forensic investigation, the ITA
applies data processing and machine learning techniques on
the ITLD data to comprehensively learn the state of the smart
environment and the users’ behavior at the time of interest
of the forensic analysis. IoTDots considers the events and
actions inferred from the ITLD data and the security policies
defined for the smart environment to detect potential security
violations from users, devices, or smart apps.
Specifically, IoTDots will look for users performing
activities that potentially violate the security policies inside
a smart environment. Also, IoTDots will use the relationship
between devices’ states to detect users trying to remove, dis-
able, or tamper IoT devices and/or malicious apps modifying
the data extracted from the smart environment.
We evaluate IoTDots in a smart environment con-
taining different types of devices including smart lights,
smart thermostats, motion sensors, etc. Experimental results
demonstrate that IoTDots performs very well on detecting,
storing, and processing forensically-relevant data from the
smart environment. Specifically, for activity detection, our
framework achieves up to 98% accuracy for both time-
dependent1 and time-independent2 activities. On the other
hand, for the case of behavior detection, our framework
achieves 96% accuracy. Additionally, a detailed performance
analysis shows that no overhead is imposed to the smart
devices and minimal overhead is imposed to the use of
physical memory and latency on the cloud-based servers as
a result of utilizing IoTDots.
Summary of Contributions: The contribution of this work
are as follows:
• We propose IoTDots, a novel digital forensic frame-
work for smart settings. Our framework automati-
cally analyzes and modifies smart apps to detect and
store forensically-relevant data from smart devices,
apps, and users. Then, in the case of a foren-
sic investigation, IoTDots applies data processing
and machine learning techniques to detect valuable
forensic evidence from smart devices, apps, and
users’ activities and behavior.
• We made the IoTDots-Modifier freely available on-
line at so IoTDots users can use our automated
system to perform source code analysis and modi-
fication of their smart apps to enable IoTDots.
• We used a threat model that considered users per-
forming activities that violate the security policies
inside a smart environment. Also, our threat model
protects device and data integrity by considering the
cases of malicious users tampering smart devices
and apps poisoning the smart environment data or
misreporting device states.
• We evaluated IoTDots in a realistic smart office
setup that contains 10 different types of smart
1Activities performed only over certain specific time frame t.
2Activities performed freely without considering any specific time frame.
devices including smart lights, smart thermostats,
motion sensors, etc. and 22 devices in total.
• Our results demonstrate that IoTDots achieves very
high accuracy on revealing forensic-relevant activi-
ties and behavior inside the smart environment.
• Finally, since IoTDots focuses on forensic-relevant
data only, its performance does not represent ad-
ditional overhead in terms of computing resources
to the smart devices and minimal overhead to the
cloud-based servers.
Organization: The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
In Section II, we present the background information. Then,
a use case and the threat model are described in Section III.
Section IV details the architecture of IoTDots and Section
V describes the data processing and machine learning tech-
niques utilized by the proposed forensic framework. Then,
the evaluation results are analyzed in Section VI, followed
by the benefits, challenges, limitations of IoTDots and future
work in Section VII. Finally, the related work in Section VIII
and the conclusions in Section IX complete the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Digital Forensics: The term digital forensics refers to the
investigation and the uncovering of any kind of evidence
from electronic devices containing digital data. The most
basic application of digital forensics investigations is to
either support or oppose the hypothesis proposed in a case
before a court. Frequently, digital forensics requires the
analysis of physical evidence directly related to people’s
presence in the event scene such as an audio or video
file. In other cases, a more deep investigation of more
technical evidence such as network data or mobile device
forensics may be required. Complex cases may require the
combination of both types of analysis.
Although there are different approaches, a standard dig-
ital forensics process can be completely described with five
different stages [5], [6]: (1) Identification, (2) Preservation,
(3) Recovery, (4) Analysis, and (5) Presentation. Depending
on the type of device analyzed and the source of the
evidence, the methodology used and the type of evidence
extracted may differ. For example, while a mobile device is
a good source of information for tracking the location of a
person, a computer may have the capability to provide more
detailed and varied intelligence.
IoT Forensics: With the growth of IoT, the digital forensics
is not anymore limited to storage devices like USB drives,
computers, or smartphones. Now, the data from devices like
a smart lock, smartwatch, or motion sensors can also be used
for forensic purposes [7], [8]. The heterogeneous data that
these devices can provide based on their interaction with
users’ day-to-day activities are very valuable. For example,
a smart lock can reveal when and who entered the building
or a smart speaker may reveal the exact location of its user
during the time of an incident. However, the use of data
from smart devices is not a straightforward exercise due to
some unique challenges present in the IoT:
Variety of network protocols: Although there are some
popular wireless communication protocols used for commu-
nication purposes such as WiFi or ZigBee, there exists no
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common standard for all smart devices [9]. This situation can
generate inconsistencies in the smart setup topologies. For
instance, in some cases of ZigBee-enabled devices, a smart
hub is required to connect the devices to the internet while
in WiFi-enabled devices, a direct connection to a gateway
is possible. As a consequence of this diversity, it is difficult
to identify the source of the evidence data in most cases.
• Limited computing resources: Most of the smart
devices are very limited in terms of power, compu-
tational resources, and storage capacity [2]. These
restrictions make it harder to store and process the
data inside the devices for forensic purposes. To
solve this limitation, an alternative would be to
transmit and store all the data to a remote server.
• High divergence and diversity in smart data: In
traditional digital forensics investigations, the data is
normally collected from specific devices of interest.
However, in IoT forensics, the data can be collected
from a diverse set of devices [10]. Different data
sources may have different impact and meaning
during a digital forensic investigation. Therefore, it
is required to have a reliable mechanism that can
successfully handle the data collected from different
types of smart devices.
III. THREAT MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In this section, we describe the assumptions focusing on
a use case where IoTDots can be utilized to perform forensic
investigations. Moreover, we explain the details of the threat
model assumed to classify forensically-valuable anomalous
user activities and malicious behavior from users and smart
apps in a smart environment.
A. Assumptions
This work assumes that there exists an office O. The of-
fice has several devices integrated to create a fully equipped
smart environment. The topology of the smart environment
in O includes devices like smart thermostats, smart locks,
smart lights, presence sensors, security cameras, and smart
smoke detectors. We also assume that the general manager
Bob is the only person in O with administrative rights to
handle the apps that control the smart devices. Such apps
have been previously modified by the IoTDots framework
and, by policy, they are the only ones authorized to be used
to manage the devices inside O. Finally, the security policies
of O prohibit the presence of any person between 8:00
pm to 7:00 am from Monday through Friday and anytime
during the weekends. At some point, a fire incident inside
O has caused the loss of sensitive information along with
important economic consequences. The fire department has
determined that the fire was generated during the night time
and a forensic investigation is requested.
We introduce IoTDots as a novel framework that can
utilize the logs from the IoT-modified apps to perform the
forensic analysis of the event in O. Indeed, IoTDots can
be used in conjunction with traditional forensic analysis
tools and techniques to hold the responsible person, smart
app, or device (if any) accountable if a case of negligence
or deliberate violation of security policies is detected. By
using IoTDots, several forensic-related questions can be
answered: (1) What was happening inside O right before
the fire incident had occurred (e.g., right before the smart
smoke detector started sensing the smoke presence)?; (2)
Was anyone inside the room (e.g., presence sensor state
changed)?; (3) Was the door opened/closed anytime before
the fire incident (e.g., smart locker state changed)?. Further,
the proposed framework would be able to evaluate the
different states of the smart environment inside O and match
them with the security policies in place to detect any (in-
tentional or involuntary) violation of security policies (e.g.,
Bob accessing the office at night time) or malicious activities
from users (e.g., Bob tampering the security camera to
avoid video recording) or smart apps (e.g., apps containing
malicious functions to modify the values from the presence
sensor possibly by a remote attacker).
B. Threat and Forensic Model
IoTDots analyzes data from a smart environment to pro-
vide answers during the course of a forensic investigation.
These answers should provide enough information to either
exonerate innocent people or hold the responsible person
accountable for his/her actions. To achieve that, the frame-
work needs to be able to successfully detect and characterize
any forensically-valuable information, including regular user
activities, anomalous user activities, and malicious behavior
from users, smart apps, and devices. Within the context of
this work, we define these operations as follows:
• Regular User Activities: Any action performed by
the authorized users inside the smart environment
that does not violate the security policies in place.
• Anomalous User Activities: Any careless and un-
intentional action performed by an authorized user
inside the smart environment that is considered a
violation of the security policies in place.
• Malicious Behavior: Any intentional action per-
formed by authorized users, non-authorized users,
smart apps, and/or smart devices that clearly violates
the security policies and is considered a threat for
other users and/or the state of the smart environ-
ment.
Hence, for IoTDots, we consider two different sets of
forensically-valuable threats: (1) anomalous user activities
and (2) malicious behavior from users or smart apps.
To evaluate IoTDots in detecting anomalous user activi-
ties, we consider the following time-based activities:
• Time-independent Activity 1: An authorized user
controlling a smart device in an anomalous manner
inside the smart environment at any time.
• Time-independent Activity 2: An authorized user
controlling a smart device in an anomalous manner
from outside of the smart environment at any time.
• Time-independent Activity 3: An authorized user
having an unauthorized presence in a specific area
within the smart environment at any time.
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Threat Time-dependency Attack Method Specific Attack Examples
Activity-1 Time-independent Tampered device Bob changes the orientation of the presence sensorto fit in a new equipment
Activity-2 Time-independent Authorized user Bob manually lowers the temperature of smart thermostat fromhome the night before of a big meeting with the stakeholders
Activity-3 Time-independent Authorized user Bob is inside the office O at 8:45 pm
Activity-4 Time-dependent Authorized/unauthorized user Bob is getting into the office at 8:45 pm
Activity-5 Time-dependent Authorized/unauthorized user Bob is using the secure pin to unlock the smart lock
Behavior-1 Time-independent Tampered device Bob disables the smart camera to stop recording while he isperforming unauthorized activities inside the office O
Behavior-2 Time-independent Unauthorized user/attacker Alice gets access to the office O using the smart lock pinthat she obtained through a malicious app that leaks information
Behavior-3 Time-independent Malicious app The presence sensor app reports inverted states to IoTDots
Behavior-4 Time-independent Malicious app The smoke detector app triggers the smart windowsand locks open by reporting false user presence
Behavior-5 Time-independent Malicious app The smart light app disable the compromised smart cameraby creating a specific light on/off pattern
Table I: Summary of the threat model and forensically-valuable activities and behavior considered for IoTDots.
• Time-dependent Activity 4: An authorized/unautho-
rized user moving inside the smart environment at
an unusual time.
• Time-dependent Activity 5: An authorized/unautho-
rized user accessing the smart environment at an
unusual time.
Since IoTDots considers the security policies of a smart
environment to perform its analysis, we categorize user
activities as time-independent and time-depended. In the first
group, we include all the user actions whose execution time
is irrelevant to IoTDots as it is not regulated as part of
the security policies. From the previous list, Activity-1, -
2, and -3 can be considered as time-independent actions as
they do not depend on time. On the other hand, the second
group gathers those actions whose execution time is strictly
regulated by the security policies of the smart environment.
In this category, we include Activity-4 and -5 because they
can only be considered forensically-valuable during a certain
period of time (e.g., the presence of an authorized user in
O is only considered a violation between 8:00 pm and 7:00
am).
Further, we also consider the following forensic behav-
iors from users or smart apps as part of the threat model for
IoTDots.
• Behavior 1: An authorized user can try to tamper,
destroy, or remove devices to prevent that the IoT-
Dots logs can be acquired and sent to the ITLD.
• Behavior 2: An attacker uses a malicious app to
get unauthorized physical or logical access to the
smart environment. This threat represents a case of
impersonation attack.
• Behavior 3: A malicious app reporting incorrect
states (e.g., fake logs) to IoTDots to cover malicious
activities. This threat represents a case of false data
injection attack.
• Behavior 4: A malicious app installed in the smart
environment changes the normal behavior of other
smart home devices and applications by enforcing
incorrect device states. This threat represents a case
of denial-of-service attack.
• Behavior 5: A malicious app triggers malicious
actions in other devices and apps by executing a
specific activity pattern. This threat represents a case
of a side channel attack.
Finally, Table I summarizes the threat model specifying
attack examples, the time-dependency categorization for
every action/behavior, and the methods of the attacks.
IV. IOTDOTS ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we present the general architecture of
IoTDots. Also, we detail the analysis of smart applications
to enable IoTDots and the use of IoTDots Log Database
(ITLD) for forensic purposes.
A. Overview
Our general architecture divides IoTDots into two parts:
First, the IoTDots-Modifier (ITM) automatically analyzes
and modifies the smart apps at compile time to allow
forensically-relevant data to be sent to the ITLD in the form
of forensic logs; second, logs from the IoTDots-modified
smart apps stored in ITLD are processed by the IoTDots-
Analyzer (ITA) to extract valuable forensic information.
With this architecture, we envision the utilization of IoTDots
in a corporate smart environment where only the use of
IoTDots-modified smart apps is authorized. Figure 1 shows
the proposed architecture for the ITM. For the purpose of
this work, we target open source IoT programming platforms
since our implementation requires source code modification.
Such modification requires that the ITM performs source
code processing via static analysis on the smart apps’ source
codes directly extracted from the smart app repositories [11].
Hence, the ITM process includes (1) the analysis of the
source code of the smart apps [12], [13], (2) forensically-
relevant information detection, and (3) smart apps modifi-
cation. Then, upon utilization, the IoTDots-modified apps
send forensically-relevant logs containing states and actions
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SmartApp Repository
Smart App Modification
(log insertions)
Source Code Analysis
(sources, sinks, entry points)
Forensically-relevant Points
(device states, data flow)
Smart Environment Setup
(IoTDots-modified Apps at runtime)
Smart App
Source Code
IoTDots Modifier (ITM)
IoTDots Logs Database 
(ITLD)
1
2
3
Figure 1: The architecture of the ITM. Smart apps are
analyzed to detect and log forensic-relevant data points at
compile time. Then, the logs are sent to the ITLD at runtime.
occurring in the smart environment to the ITLD at runtime.
Finally, the logs are organized and kept in the ITLD.
The second part of the architecture involves ITA, which
is shown in Figure 2. This stage performs data processing
and analytics on IoTDots. The purpose of this analysis is
to extract forensically-relevant information from the smart
app logs. This information may potentially allow learning
the state of the smart environment setup at any time. Also,
this analysis provides insights into the users’ activities
occurring inside the smart environment. IoTDots is a frame-
work capable of performing data processing and applying
machine learning techniques to successfully combine logs
from different smart devices, obtain a full description of
the smart environment setup state, and learn all the possible
activities that the users were performing inside the smart
environment exactly at the time of interest of the forensic
analysis. Finally, these activities are correlated with the
security policies defined for the smart environment to detect
user activities and potential malicious behaviors from users
and smart apps. In the next sub-sections, we detail the
important aspects of these operations.
B. IoTDots Modifier (ITM)
In this sub-section, we detail the ITM. As mentioned
before, this part of the IoTDots framework analyzes the
source code from the original smart applications to detect
forensically-relevant information and automatically inserts
specific logs for tracking purposes. Then, at runtime, the
logs are stored in the ITLD where they are later analyzed for
forensic purposes. In this work, we are targeting open source
IoT programming platforms (e.g., Samsung SmartThings,
IoTDots Logs Database
             (ITLD)
IoTDots Analyzer (ITA)
Behavior Detection
User Activity Inference
Security Policies 
Auditor
Activity Detection
Figure 2: The architecture for ITA. In the case of a foren-
sic investigation, IoTDots logs are analyzed for potential
forensically-valuable activities from users, apps, and devices
in a smart environment.
OpenHAB, and Apple’s HomeKit) which make the source
code of smart apps available online [11], [14], [15], [16].
However, before completing these steps, we first need to
answer some key questions: What does the smart app life-
cycle look like? How to define forensically-relevant infor-
mation inside the smart app’s source code? Where and how
smart apps need to be modified to implement IoTDots? The
following dissection of smart apps provides the answers to
these questions.
1) Smart Apps Structure: In general, smart app pro-
gramming platforms [17], [18], [19] define the means to
access and handle the apps’ data and to transmit them
out of the applications. Through these processes, smart
applications can utilize device sensor readings, user-defined
inputs, and events to execute the application logic either in
the hub (i.e., hub-based setup) or in the cloud (i.e., cloud-
based setup). Therefore, through the analysis of the smart
applications’ structure, one can identify and label smart app
information points that could potentially contain relevant
data for forensic purposes. In the following, we describe five
different smart app resources that are labeled by IoTDots
as they potentially contain relevant information for forensic
analysis.
• Events: These are used to respond to changes in the
physical environment. At install time and depending
on the app context, a smart application subscribes to
a set of device events. Then, event handler methods
are called every time such events occur. For forensic
analysis, events are important since they define
physical changes in the smart environment setup.
In our analysis, we include device events as part of
IoTDots’ forensically-relevant information.
• Actions: After an event occurs, a smart app calls an
action to control the affected device. Actions give
ideas on how a smart environment setup respond
to device changes. Often, these actions contain
valuable timing information that can define changes
in forensic timelines.
• User-defined Inputs: Smart applications often re-
quire inputs from users either to manage the ap-
plication logic or to control devices. These inputs
are defined at install time and determine specific
thresholds to trigger actions. Also, user inputs may
define contact information to allow notification from
smart apps to be sent to specific recipients. Changes
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in user-defined inputs are critical for forensic pur-
poses since unauthorized modifications will directly
impact the execution of the apps’ events and actions
and its notification process.
• Device Information: Applications also grant access
to devices at install time to implement the appli-
cation logic. Such devices complete the list of au-
thorized smart entities in smart environment setups.
Logging this information allows tracing authorized
or unauthorized changes in the environment.
• Time and Location: Successful forensic analysis of
a smart environment requires not only the timing
information of events/actions, but also the physical
location from where these events/actions were gen-
erated. In that way, such events can be directly at-
tached to specific geo-location information of smart
devices.
The first step toward analyzing the smart app source
code is to focus on the application’s structure. In general,
a smart app’s structure follows the sensor-computation-
actuator paradigm, which means, smart solutions are in gen-
eral designed the same way regardless of their specific ap-
plication and complexity. This common architecture highly
simplifies the step of modeling the application structure from
its source code. The benefits from modeling the smart app
include the extraction of smart apps’ entry points, events,
and control flow of data. Also, it allows to identify entry/exit
points of data (i.e., sources of data and sink functions)
that are used to first define the origin of forensic-relevant
information, and second how this information is sent out
from the smart apps and to where.
2) Smart Apps Data Access Points: Smart app program-
ming platforms clearly define APIs [20], [21] to transmit
data outside the applications. These APIs can be categorized
into two main groups:
• Internet: Smart apps logic normally run as cloud
services. This imposes a noticeable difference if
compared to other domains (e.g., mobile) where
local solutions are preferred. Therefore, smart apps
are designed to directly act as web services or make
calls to external services defined by the developers.
These calls can make requests to smart apps via end-
points to obtain information such as device states,
events, or even propose specific actions to control
the smart solution. With IoTDots, we trace these
requests through a custom logging mechanism.
• Messages: Smart applications can also define cus-
tom messages to send notifications to users. These
notifications can be of the three different types:
push notification in the mobile app, email, or short
message services (SMS). This allows the developer
to create a dedicated notification system to alert
the user when specific events occur. Our framework
also traces and stores these notifications for forensic
purposes.
3) Source Code and IoTDots Modifications of Smart
Apps: The purpose of the source code analysis of smart
apps in IoTDots is to automatically detect the previously
Listing 1: A sample code for a SmartThings App
1 /* A section of a code block of an original smart app
*/
2
3 section("Via a push notification and/or an SMS message") {
4 input("recipients", "contact", title: "Send notifications
to") {
5 input "phone", "phone", title: "Enter a phone number to
get SMS", required: false
6 }
7 }
Listing 2: A sample code for an IoTDots-modified SmartThings App
1 /* A section of a code block of an IoTDots-modified
smart app */
2
3 section("Via a push notification and/or an SMS message") {
4 input("recipients", "contact", title: "Send notifications
to") {
5 input "phone", "phone", title: "Enter a phone number to
get SMS", required: false
6 }
7 log.iotdots (”New recipient defined: $phone”) //IoTDots log
8 }
defined points of interest inside the source code and in-
sert tracking logs for forensic purposes. The source code
analysis starts by constructing an Inter-procedural Con-
trol Flow Graph (ICFG) of the apps and by extract-
ing the nodes that define events, actions, user inputs,
etc. For the specific purpose of this work, we target
Samsung SmartThings applications which are written in
Groovy. Groovy is a Java-based programming language
that defines visitors for app methods and variables through
the ASTTransformationCollectorCodeVisitor
at compile time [22]. These visitors are then used to con-
struct the Abstract Syntax Tree (AST) of the smart apps.
The ITM contains a customizer that (1) visits each node of
the ICFG looking for forensic-relevant points and (2) modify
the apps by inserting forensic logs in such points.
In Listing 1 and Listing 2, we show how a smart
application is modified by IoTDots for forensic purposes.
After performing the source code analysis of the original
app (see Listing 1), IoTDots flags a user-defined input
recipients. This input defines the phone number to
which all the notification from the smart apps will be sent to.
As explained earlier in this section, these types of inputs are
very critical for forensic purposes since careless or malicious
users can modify this info anytime without being noticed.
This can negatively impact the purpose of tracking the events
and actions executed by apps being utilized in a smart envi-
ronment. Going back to the previous example, after labeling
the user input, IoTDots modifies the app by inserting a
forensic log (see Listing 2). Here, log.iotdots function
defines an http request that pushes the log information
to the remote ITLD. Then, the information is perpetually
kept in the ITLD and can be accessed/processed anytime a
forensic investigation request is received.
Algorithm 1 details the processes performed by IoTDots
to analyze and modify a smart app. During Detection, the
application source code is loaded into IoTDots modifier
(Line 1). Recall that in this work, we are targeting open
source smart app application platforms so availability of the
source code is assumed. Then, the ICFG is calculated in Line
2. Once the ICFG is obtained, all the nodes are explored
and all the forensic-relevant points are flagged in Line 5.
This step concludes the Detection process in Algorithm 1.
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IoTDots Modifier Console
Iotdots-modifier.appspot.com
Modify SmartThings App Reset Console Publish This App View Recent Apps
. . .
ecobee.poll()
}
def initialize() {
subscribe(app, appTouch)
private void sendMsgWithDelay() {
if (state?.msg) {
send state.msg
}
}
def appTouch(evt) {
def plugSeLngs = [holdType: "${givenHoldType}"]
. . .
Analysis Result Stacktrace
Actions
def initialize() {
private void sendMsgWithDelay() {
if (state?.msg) {
send state.msg
}
. . .
Log.iotdots (“Method invoked: initialize”)
Log.iotdots (“Message content: state?.msg”)
Log.iotdots (“Message recipient: state?.msg”)
ecobee.poll()
subscribe(app, appTouch)
Log.iotdots (“Method invoked: subscribe”)
}. . .
Figure 3: We made IoTDots available online at https://iotdots-modifier.appspot.com/.
Finally, the Modification process customizes the smart apps
by inserting the IoTDots logs in Line 10.
Algorithm 1: Steps in the IoTDots-Modifier (ITM).
1: appSC ← app source code
Detection:
2: ICFG← createICFG(appSC)
3: if Exists ICFG then
4: for nodes in ICFG do
5: forensicPT ← forensic-relevant points
6: end for
7: end if
Modification:
8: if forensicPT then
9: for points in forensicPT do
10: Insert IoTDots Logs
11: end for
12: end if
Finally, we made ITM available online at:
https://iotdots-modifier.appspot.com/
The current version of the online tool automatically an-
alyzes and modifies smart apps from Samsung SmartThings
platform. We started implementing IoTDots for SmartThings
apps mainly because (1) this platform defines the highest
amount of different devices in the market, (2) it is open
source; so the applications’ source code can be found online,
and (3) extensive API documentation is available online [23].
Figure 3 depicts details of the online version of ITM. On the
left side, the user simply types or paste the original source
code that needs to be modified to enable IoTDots. Then, on
the right panel, the tool returns the modified app logging all
the forensically-relevant source code information points.
C. IoTDots Analyzer (ITA)
ITLD stores logs obtained from smart apps at runtime.
This allows the information from events and actions in a
smart environment to be utilized later for forensic purposes.
For successfully extracting information from the logs, we
define ITA that performs the following actions on the ITLD
data.
• Labeling: This step is used to label the data in
the ITLD. Once classified, the data can be used
to feed machine learning models to complete the
analysis. The data processing step labels the ITLD
data based on timing information and other forensic-
related features. These features may include the type
of devices generating the logs, location of these
devices, etc.
• Detection: One can think that the labeling of the
ITLD data is good enough for forensic purposes.
However, much more information can be extracted
from the IoIDots logs. In this work, we introduce
a framework not only capable of labeling the logs
based on forensic criteria (i.e. timestamp, location,
device), but also analyzing the data to infer user
activity and detect the behavior of users and smart
apps. For this purpose, ITA applies machine learning
techniques to the ITLD-labeled data to classify and
extract red-flagged forensic logs. Red-flagged logs
can be used to define events and actions related
to authorized user activity that change the smart
environment topology (e.g., unauthorized device re-
placement or tampering, changes on user-defined
inputs, unauthorized changes on setup topology,
misplace or disable of any part of the smart setup,
etc.). Also, red-flagged logs can be used by ITA
to detect the abnormal or unauthorized behavior of
users (e.g., users entering to access-limited zones
of the building after work hours) or apps (e.g.,
malicious or tampered apps that force the smart
setup to behave differently than expected).
• Infer User Activity: For the purpose of this work,
user activity is defined as any intentional or un-
intentional action performed by authorized users
that cause changes in the smart setup and also
violates the security policies established for the
smart environment. This type of classification can
hold users accountable for tampering or damaging
the smart setup to avoid forensic logs.
• Detect Behavior: For this work, behavior of users
or apps is defined as any user or app action that
intentionally changes the purpose of the apps and
also violates the security policies established for
the smart environment. This type of classification
hold users accountable of a possible misconduct or
malicious activity or, on the contrary, will hold ma-
licious or tampered smart applications responsible
for making the smart setup to behave differently
and potentially jeopardize the security of the smart
environment.
To further detail the operations of ITA, we introduce Algo-
rithm 2. In Line 1, iotLogs variable is initialized with the
content of ITLD. Additionally, the initialization step includes
updating the variable policy with the security policies that
were valid for the smart environment at the time that the
logs were acquired. Then, in Line 5 the IoTDots logs are
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organized and labeled based on the timing information, the
type of devices that generated the logs, and the location
information of the devices. With this information, a machine
learning model is applied on the data to (1) detect user
actions in the smart environment (Line 9) and (2) detect
behaviour of users and smart apps, all depending on the
security policies established at the time the logs were
acquired (Line 10). Finally, if a forensic violation is detected,
the flag is set to TRUE.
Algorithm 2: Steps in the IoTDots-Analyzer (ITA).
1: iotdLogs← ITLD
2: policy ← smart environment security policies
3: anomaly ← FALSE
Labeling:
4: for each Log in iotdLogs do
5: label Log by T ime, Device, Location
6: MLdata← labels
7: end for
Detection:
8: for data in MLdata do
9: Evaluates user activity userAct
10: ML← MLanalyzer(userAct, policy)
11: if Anomaly detected in ML then
12: anomaly ← TRUE
13: end if
14: end for
V. IOTDOTS FORENSIC EVIDENCE DETECTION
In this section, we describe the analysis techniques that
were used to identify user activities and behaviors in a smart
environment from the collected forensic data. Specifically,
we implemented a Markov Chain-based detection technique
in IoTDots.
A. IoTDots Data Characterization
As noted earlier, IoTDots collects data from a smart
environment in an ITLD that includes timing information,
sensor information, device state, location, etc. For a specific
time slot t, the data collected by IoTDots can be represented
by:
Data array,Et = {S,D,M,L}, (1)
where S represents the set of sensors’ features, D is the
set of device features, M is the features extracted from the
controlling devices (smartphone/ tablet), and L is the set of
location features of controlling devices extracted from the
log files. We describe the characteristics of these features
below.
• Timing features (T): A smart environment consists
of several sensors and devices. These sensors and
devices change their states based on different user
activities and commands associated with the smart
environment. In this context, some devices per-
form instantaneous tasks (e.g., switching lights with
motion) while some devices perform a task over
a period of time (e.g., changing temperature over
time). IoTDots considers this timing information
as a feature to infer the overall state of the smart
environment at a specific time to detect the user
activity and behavior.
• Sensor features (S): Sensors in a smart environment
work as a trigger to different devices. A smart
environment can have several different sensors (e.g.,
motion sensor, temperature sensor, presence sensor,
etc.) connected to multiple devices. These sensors
sense the changes in devices’ peripheral and help
the devices to take autonomous decisions such as
switching lights on motion, triggering fire alarm
after smoke, etc. Depending on the nature of the sen-
sors, sensor data can be both logical (active/inactive)
or numerical values. For IoTDots, we collect both
numerical values and logical states of the sensors
and create the state of the smart environment at
a specific time. We represent the change in both
logical state and a numerical value of a sensor as a
binary input (1 if active/change and 0 otherwise) to
create a forensic data matrix to train the detection
algorithm.
• Device features (D): A smart environment supports
different devices that are connected to a smart hub
and different sensors and also with each other. These
devices can perform multiple tasks as standalone
devices (e.g., smart thermostat) or as connected
devices (e.g., automatic door monitoring with smart
lock and smart camera). For different user activities
and input commands, these devices change their
states (active/inactive) in an autonomous way. IoT-
Dots collects these device state data (active/inactive
state) from the stored log of the devices.
• Controller device features (M): In a smart environ-
ment, users can use smartphones/tablets to control
any device from the associated smart apps. IoTDots
collects any control command generated from con-
troller devices to understand user activities and on-
going tasks in the smart environment.
• Location features (L): The devices connected in
a smart environment can be controlled from both
inside and outside of the location. To understand
the on-going activities in a smart environment, it
is necessary to observe the exact location of a
given command to the devices. IotDots considers the
location of both the controller and the smart devices
as a feature to understand any activities occurring
in the smart environment.
B. Analytical Model Used in IoTDots
ITA collects the information above and creates a state
array to represent the state of the smart environment at
specific time t. Each element of the state array represents
the value of the features collected by IoTDots mentioned
above. For a specific time t, we consider the combination
of all the features collected by IoTDots as binary numbers
(1 for active status and 0 for inactive status). Thus, the
state of the smart environment can be represented as a n-bit
binary number, where n is the number of features extracted
from the logs. Then, the total number of possible states of
a smart environment with n number of features (sensors’
states, devices’ states, controller devices, and locations) can
be m = 2n. IoTDots collects the state information of a smart
environment over time to train a Markov Chain detection
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model to detect forensically-valuable behavior from users,
smart apps, and devices in the system. The Markov Chain
model has two basic assumptions which are as follows:
(1) the occurrence probability of a specific state depends
only on the previous one and (2) the transition between
two consecutive states is independent of time and doesn’t
depend on any condition. Based on these assumptions, the
Markov Chain model can be illustrated by the following
equation [24].
P (Xt+1 = x|X1 = x1, X2 = x2..., Xt = xt) =
P (Xt+1 = x|Xt = xt),
when, P (X1 = x1, X2 = x2..., Xt = xt) > 0,
(2)
where Xt and Xt+1 denotes state of the smart environment
at time t and t + 1, respectively. Let assume the smart
environment has the state i at time t and j at time t+ 1. If
Pij illustrates the transition probability between state i to j,
the state transition matrix for m number of states of a smart
environment can be represented by the following matrix.
P =

P11 P12 P13 . . . . . . P1m
P21 P22 P23 . . . . . . P2m
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pm1 Pm2 Pm3 . . . . . . Pmm
 (3)
To calculate each element of the transition matrix, let assume
the smart environment has X0, X1, . . . , XT states at a given
time t = 0, 1, . . . , T . Then, each element of the transition
matrix can be represented by the following equation [24]:
Pij =
Nij
Ni
, (4)
where Nij is the total number of transition from Xt to
Xt+1 over a certain period. From the state transition ma-
trix, Markov Chain model can calculate the probability of
occurring a state or sequence of states. To predict the prob-
ability of occurring a state, let assume the initial probability
distribution of the Markov Chain model as follows:
Q = [q1 q2 q3 . . . . . . qm,] (5)
where, qm is the probability that the model is in state m at
time 0. The probability of observing a sequence of states
can be calculated by the following equation:
P (X1, X2, . . . , XT ) = qx1
T∏
2
PXt−1Xt. (6)
C. IoTDots Data Binarization
Due to the nature of the IoTDots data, the acquired logs
are not always Markov Chain-ready. In some cases, one
needs to implement a binarizer that converts numeric data
(e.g., sensor readings) into binary values that can be directly
interpreted by the Markov Chain model. We found that, for
the types of devices and sensors utilized in our evaluation,
only a few cases of sensor readings require binarization. In
these specific cases, IoTDots utilizes user-defined inputs in
the smart apps to define threshold values that automatically
convert numeric readings into binary values. For instance,
for a temperature sensor, IotDots logs the sensor value
IoTDots Logs Data Type RequiresBinarizer Comments
Location3 Binary –
Device Binary –
Sensor states Binary –
Sensor values Numeric user-define inputs
Controller Binary –
Table II: IoTDots implements a binarizer to convert numeric
logs into binary values.
for every device state change. Then, during analysis, these
values are compared against the temperature value that
the user set at install time. For sensor readings over the
threshold, IoTDots feeds a value 1 to the Markov Chain
model for that specific variable. On the other hand, for sensor
readings below the threshold, IoTDots feeds a value 0 to
the Markov Chain model. The use of user-defined inputs to
implement the binarizer provides information to the IoTDots
framework that may help to determine if the devices were
compromised or were behaving in an unexpected way during
the forensic incident. Table II summarizes the use of the
binarizer for different types of data in IoTDots.
We extract the state information of the smart environ-
ment from the collected logs and train the Markov Chain
model. IoTDots then determines the on-going activities on
the smart environment based on the state transition matrix
explained in Equation 3. IoTDots predicts the next state of
the environment and then match the predicted value with the
state inferred from the dataset to determine if the current
state has any forensic value or not.
VI. EVALUATION AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we evaluate the efficacy of IoTDots to
detect forensic incidents such as regular and anomalous user
activities as well as malicious user and smart app behaviors
in a given smart environment. For a better analysis, we
consider a hypothetical situation where a number of users
perform regular activities inside a smart office environment
while some others behave anomalously (e.g., by accessing
office locations during unauthorized hours). Also, we con-
sider another group of users that try to disable some smart
devices to change the configuration of the smart environment
and some malicious apps that poison the data from a specific
number of devices. As detailed in Section IV, our framework
needs to first detect the forensically-valuable user activities
to then classify them in regular or anomalous activities based
on the security policies in place. In parallel, IoTDots has to
be able to detect any forensically valuable behavior. We built
the Markov Chain-based detection method for this purpose
and train our model with data collected by IoTDots from
a realistic smart office environment. Also, we evaluated the
general overhead introduced by IoTDots to smart devices
and cloud-based servers.
A. Training Environment and Data Collection
To test the efficacy of the IoTDots performance, we
collected daily usage data from a smart office environment.
First, for training purposes, we implemented an emulator
3Refers to the Location Modes ”Office” or ”Other”.
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environment where day-to-day user activities could be sim-
ulated in a timely order. Then, the same activities were
executed in real-life settings to collect log data from the
real smart apps.
1) Training Environment Setup: IoTDots is evaluated
using smart apps and devices from Samsung SmartThings
platform. This allows performing tests using an IoT pro-
gramming platform that defines the highest number of smart
devices and has one of the largest market share [25]. Also,
SmartThings allows user-specific apps to be installed in
a system which enables a multiple apps environment. We
built a real-life setting with different devices and popular
smart home apps available in the SmartThings App Market.
A detailed list of the different device types used in the
experiments is given in Table III.
Device
Type Model
Smart Home Hub Samsung SamrtThings Hub
. Smart Light Philips Hue Light Bulb
Smart Lock
Yale B1L Lock with
Z-Wave Push Button
Deadbolt
Fire Alarm
First Alert 2-in-1
Z-Wave Smoke Detector and
Carbon Monoxide Alarm
Smart Monitoring System Arlo by NETGEARSecurity System
Smart Thermostat Ecobee 4 Smart Thermostat
Motion Sensor
Light Sensor
Temperature Sensor
Fibaro FGMS-001 Motion Sensor
Door Sensor Samsung Multipurpose Sensor
Table III: List of smart devices used during the experiments.
Our set of forensically-valuable activities includes the
following scenarios:
• Time-dependent access: We provide user access to
all the devices during office hours to observe user
activities in the smart environment.
• Restricted access: For specific places in the smart
environment, we enforce restricted access policies.
• Multi-user environment: We consider a multi-user
environment where different users perform different
activities inside the smart environment. In a multi-
user scenario, we also consider time-dependent ac-
cess and restricted access to emulate the real-life
smart office environment.
2) Data Collection: To enable the data collection, we
used ITM to automatically modify the SmartThing apps
by performing source code analysis to detect forensically-
relevant information inside the source code and insert spe-
cific logs. Then, while utilizing the apps, IoTDots data was
sent to the ITLD. We collected data from the interaction
of 10 different users and 22 smart devices (10 different
types of devices and sensors, as shown in Table III) and
sensors for seven days for a total of 84209 forensically-
valuable data incidents. Our dataset included data collected
from benign and malicious environments. For the first case,
the users were allowed to perform anomalous activities
in clear violation of the security policies defined for our
experiments. These anomalous activities are described in
Section III. In total, we collected benign forensic data from
30 different experiments with over 3000 instances for five
different forensically-valuable anomalous behaviors.
For collecting data from a malicious forensic environ-
ment, we considered two different cases with users and
smart apps. For the case of users, we considered users
trying to modify, tamper, remove, or destroy the devices
with the intention of changing the original setup of the
smart environment and prevent that forensic logs can be
sent to the ITLD for future analysis. On the other hand, for
the apps, we installed different popular SmartThings apps
along with multiple malicious apps [26]. We created four
different forensic scenarios (see Section III) and built their
corresponding smart apps similar to [12], [27] based on
the threat model explained in Section III. For Threat 2, we
created two different apps for a smart lock that leaked the
access code to an unauthorized person. This also represents
device tampering by authorized users. For Threat 3, we built
an app that injected forged data in a fire alarm and triggered
the alarm maliciously. For Threat 4, we developed an app
that could shut down the smart thermostat for a specific
input temperature. Finally, for Threat 5, we created an app
for a smart camera that could be triggered by a specific light
pattern. In total, for these different scenarios, we collected
50 different forensic datasets to test the effectiveness of
IoTDots.
We also note that we used 75% of the user data to
train the Markov Chain model and then combined the rest
25% of the data along with malicious data to test ITA.
For performance metrics, we utilized standard parameter,
including accuracy, F-score, True Positive Rate (TPR), False
Positive Rate (FPR), True Negative Rate (TNR), and False
Negative Rate (FNR).
B. Forensic Activity Detection from Users
The state of the interconnected devices inside the smart
environment depends on the on-going user activities. For
example, while a user moves from one place to another,
several devices and sensors become active. The changes
on device states can be an instantaneous event (a specific
event at a specific time such as switching on a light) or
a combination of sequential events over a period of time
(motion from one place to another).
User
Activity TPR FNR TNR FPR ACC
F-
Score
Activity-1 0.9914 0.0086 0.9371 0.0629 0.9823 0.9635
Activity-2 0.9926 0.0074 0.9334 0.0666 0.9874 0.9621
Activity-3 0.9886 0.0114 0.9619 0.0381 0.9830 0.9750
Activity-4 0.9687 0.0313 0.8714 0.1286 0.9484 0.9175
Activity-5 0.9555 0.0445 0.8708 0.1292 0.9388 0.9112
Table IV: Performance evaluation of IoTDots for inferring
forensically-valuable user activities.
Table IV illustrates the detailed evaluation of IoTDots
for user activity inference. One can observe that for time-
independent actions (i.e., Activity 1-3), IoTDots can achieve
both accuracy (i.e., ACC) and F-score over 98% and 96%,
respectively. True Positive Rate (TPR) and True Negative
Rate (TNR) are also high (over 98% and 93%, respectively).
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Figure 4: IoTDots evaluation results for different forensic incidents: (a) Accuracy of IoTDots on inferring activities in multi-
user scenarios, (b) accuracy of IoTDots on detecting forensic behavior from users versus the number of tampered devices,
and (c) accuracy of IoTDots on detecting forensic behavior from smart apps versus different number of devices. The different
curves represent the performance of IoTDots for activities and behaviour as described in Section III.
On the other hand, for time-dependent actions (i.e., Activity
4-5), IoTDots achieves the highest accuracy and F-score of
94.84% and 91.75%, respectively. Since the time-dependent
actions are related to user motions, different users may
have different patterns of motion which increases the False
Positive rate (FPR) and False Negative rate (FNR). In sum-
mary, IoTDots achieves over 93% of accuracy for detecting
different user activities forensically. User action inference in
the smart environment also depends on the number of users
present in the environment.
For the case of a multi-user smart environment, IoTDots
requires a different analysis since users can perform different
tasks at once which can directly impact the accuracy of
the user action inference. In Figure 4(a), the accuracy of
forensic action inference is shown with respect to the number
of present users in the smart environment. As analyzed, it
can be observed how the accuracy values decrease with the
users. From Figure 4(a), one can observe that for time-
independent activities (Activity-1, Activity-2, Activity-3),
IoTDots achieves accuracy in the range of 98% to 95%.
For time-dependent activities (Activity-4, Activity-5), the
accuracy of IoTDots varies from 95% to 86% as the number
of users increases.
C. Detection of Forensic Behavior from Users
Smart devices installed in a smart environment are vul-
nerable to device tampering which can lead to malicious
events. In previous works that proposed the use of IoT
data for forensic investigations, device integrity was always
assumed and the results were vulnerable to insiders [1].
IoTDots can detect tampered devices based on the collected
logs from the smart environments. For this, the Markov
Chain model analyses the state of all the devices in the
smart environment at any given time and detects malicious
or unexpected states by comparing data from similar de-
vices sharing the same context (i.e., device cooperation).
During device cooperation, if one device is compromised
or tampered, the information collected from other trusted
devices inside the environment is used to detect the one
reporting fake data. On the other hand, if the majority of
the devices are compromised, the overall system cannot
be trusted which will impact the evaluation. For example,
consider a smart light that is controlled by a motion sensor.
During normal operations, if the sensor detects any motion,
the light will be on. However, in the event of a compromised
state of the smart light, the light will not operate properly
with the motion sensor. On the other hand, if the motion
sensor is compromised too, it would be hard to define which
device is hampering the normal operation of the devices.
Figure 4(b) depicts the accuracy of IoTDots on detecting
tampered or modified devices in a smart environment. For
this, we installed 22 different devices (including smart
sensors) in a smart office environment. One can notice from
Figure 4(b) that IoTDots can achieve near 100% of accuracy
on cases with 2 tampered devices in the environment. In
general, the accuracy of IoTDots decreases as the number
of tampered devices increase in the system. Finally, Figure
4(b) demonstrate how device cooperation is affected by the
number of compromised devices. One can observe how the
accuracy values drop when more than 10 devices (near 50%
of the total number of devices) are compromised.
D. Detection of Forensic Behavior from Smart Apps
IoT programming platforms offer customized apps to
control the smart devices. In recent years, researchers have
reported several malicious apps that can perform malicious
activities in a smart environment [28], [29]. In this section,
we test the efficacy of IoTDots in detecting behaviors in a
smart environment caused by apps installed on the devices.
As noted earlier, we consider four different scenarios to eval-
uate app behavior in IotDots (Section III). To evaluate these
scenarios, we installed malicious IoTDots-modified apps in
a real-life smart environment (smart office). Table V shows
the evaluation of IoTDots in detecting app’s behavior in the
smart environment. One can observe that IoTDots achieves
high accuracy and F-score for all the aforementioned cases
(over 95% and 89%, respectively).
Behavioral
Model TPR FNR TNR FPR ACC
F-
Score
Behavior-2 0.9564 0.0436 0.8479 0.1521 0.9468 0.8989
Behavior-3 0.9669 0.0331 0.9333 0.0667 0.9636 0.9498
Behavior-4 0.9725 0.0275 0.9289 0.0711 0.9670 0.9502
Behavior-5 0.9647 0.0353 0.8953 0.1047 0.9572 0.9287
Table V: Performance evaluation of IoTDots in detecting
forenscially valuable behavior from smart apps.
In Figure 4(c), the accuracy of IoTDots is shown for
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different forensic cases with respect to the number of devices
presented in the environment. IoTDots achieves the highest
accuracy of over 97% for Behavior-3 and the lowest accu-
racy of 92.3% for Behavior-2 in the case of only one device
installed in the system. With the increase in the number
of devices, the accuracy decreases to 95% and 90% for
Behavior-3 and Behavior-2, respectively. The accuracy of
detecting Behavior-4 and Behavior-5 varies between 97% to
95% and 94.8% to 93% with the number of devices in the
system, respectively.
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Figure 5: Average latency imposed by IoTDots to smart
apps’ execution times. The maximum latency (2.4s) is ob-
tained when synchronous HTTP requests are utilized to send
the logs to ITLD. Then, the latency is significantly reduced
to 280 ms after using the asynchronous HTTP requests.
Finally, the minimum latency (25ms) is obtained after com-
bining the asynchronous HTTP request with AtomicState
queuing.
E. System Overhead
Since most of the smart apps are cloud-based, we do
not expect that IoTDots impose any overhead on the smart
devices. However, it is necessary to evaluate the impact of
IoTDots on the computing resources of the IoT smart apps
servers in the cloud. To assess this, we selected two metrics
that are directly related with (1) the amount of physical
memory occupied by the IoTDots-modified apps and (2) the
latency of the smart apps in their operations and responses.
Physical Memory: Since server space is costly, we need
to evaluate how much more physical space the IoTDots-
modified apps require from the cloud servers if compared
with the original smart apps (previous to IoTDots modifica-
tion). On average, ITM adds around 110 new lines of code
to the original smart apps source code, which represent an
increase of around only 5KB of physical memory space per
app.
Latency: For the purpose of this work, we define latency
as the extra delay imposed by the IoTDots-modified apps
source code to the original execution time of the smart apps.
In general, the latency depends on (1) the number of times
that the IoTDots logs are sent to the cloud and (2) the
IOTDots log function execution time. In terms of latency,
the worst case scenario is obtained when an individual
synchronous http request is called for every single IoTDots
log. In that case, around 2.4s latency is added every time
a log is sent from the app to ITLD, which represents a
big overhead to the app operation. To avoid this latency,
IoTDots utilizes asynchronous HTTP request to send data
to ITDL. Since we are evaluating apps from the Samsung
Smartthings platform, we utilized the beta version of the
asynchttp_v1 class [23] to asynchronously send the logs
to the database. Further, we reduced the latency overhead
even more by avoiding http requests every time a new
log is generated. For this, we utilized the AtomicState
variable in SmartThings to queue and map several logs
together before communicating with the ITDL. Finally, with
these modifications, the average latency overhead imposed
by IoTDots is reduced to around 30 ms for every http
request to the ITDL (see Figure 5).
F. Summary
Overall, our evaluation results showed that IoTDots can
infer and classify forensically valuable user activities by
considering changes in sensor reading and device states. For
inferring such activities, IoTDots pairs user activities with
the security policies defined for the smart environment to
detect the activities. This may help the forensic investigators
to know what was happening before, during, and after the
time of the analyzed incidents. Furthermore, forensic results
can be extended by considering the sequence of the different
device states in the smart environment over time, which may
help to create a timeline of the incidents. Our results showed
that forensically-valuable information can be easily detected
with high accuracy using the previously mentioned features.
This may help the investigator to further analyze if incidents
were caused due to users’ negligence or due to specific
activities (either benign or malicious).
VII. BENEFITS, CHALLENGES, LIMITATIONS, AND
FUTURE WORK
There are several benefits associated with the use of
IoTDots. Also, some challenges and limitations can be
highlighted.
1) Forensic Framework for Smart Environments:
Smart environments are equipped with a myriad of
different smart devices and sensors. This represents
a new domain of relevant data that can be used for
forensic purposes. In this context, IoTDots emerges
as the first practical solution that collects, stores,
and processes smart environment data to instrument
forensic analysis.
2) Automatic Log Insertion: IoTDots-Modifier auto-
matically analyzes smart apps source code to iden-
tify and log forensic-relevant data. Then, the logs
are sent to a database where the data is kept for
future analysis. The current version of IoTDots
performs automatic analysis and modification for
Samsung SmartThings apps only. The new version
with support to other IoT programming platforms
is currently under development. Despite most IoT
apps follow similar architectural paradigms, dif-
ferences in the programming languages and other
platform-specific features make the expansion of
IoTDots to other platforms a challenge.
3) Deep Data Analysis: IoTDots-Analyzer incorpo-
rates data processing and machine learning tech-
niques to label the IoTDots data and detect
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Tool Name IFA
Cross
App
Analysis
Consider
Devices
No Platform
Modification
Consider
Tampered
Devices
Goals & Comments
FlowFence Protects data by enforcing data flow policies from users.
ContextIoT Detects malicious data flow by analyzing appcontext in a simulation environment.
ProvThings
Detects malicious data flow by analyzing app context in
real environments. Considers app-device and device-device
interactions.
SaINT Detects data exflitrations from smart apps.
IoTDots
Enables forensics analysis in smart environments.
Assumes device-device, app-device, and user-device
interactions. Considers tampered devices.
Table VI: Comparison between IoTDots and other IFA tools.
forensically-valuable anomalous activity and be-
havior from users, smart apps, and devices in a
smart environment. The current version has shown
excellent results on accuracy metrics for different
cases of numbers of users and devices. However,
analysis of new evaluation cases may be necessary.
For instance, different machine learning algorithms
may be considered to avoid conversion of the IoT
data into Markov binary states.
4) Low overhead: IoTDots imposes minimal to no
overhead to the devices deployed in the smart envi-
ronment and very low overhead to the cloud servers
supporting the smart apps. In general, IoTDots-
modified apps contain around 110 lines more on
average if compared with the original smart apps.
Also, the latency imposed by sending the IoTDots
logs to the cloud is very low.
5) Applicability: The approach used in IoTDots can
be easily generalized to any IoT platform. For
the current version, IoTDots takes advantage of
open source platforms to enable simplicity. Closed-
source IoT systems like HomeSeer [30] and
HomeOS [31] may require modification on ITM
to allow source code analysis of the apps and the
implementation of an effective logging system.
As future work, we aim to incorporate new smart app
platforms to IoTDots. Since different platforms may use
different programming languages and APIs, the ITM may
require some architectural modifications to enable source
code analysis. Also, future versions of our framework will
incorporate new threats to the analyzer as new types of
devices and user behaviors are considered in the smart
environment.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Smart environments such as smart home systems have
become popular in recent years. However, there exists no
comprehensive platform for forensic analysis of data from
a smart environment that considers the interaction between
smart devices, users, and the security policies in place.
In this section, we discuss existing forensic data analysis
platforms for smart environments and their shortcomings.
1) Forensic Data Collection from the Smart Environment:
Researchers have proposed different approaches to collect
forensic data from smart environment and smart devices.
Some of these works only focus on vendor-specific de-
vices [32], while others present general methods to only
collect forensic data without any data analysis option [33],
[34]. Kebande et al. proposed a generic approach, DFIF-
IoT, to analyze digital forensic data in IoT settings [35].
Here, the authors presented a generalized method to capture
forensic data from IoT devices including cloud, network,
and device-level forensic data. However, DFIF-IoT only
discusses the theoretical approach to collect forensic data
from IoT environment without any real-life implementation
and evaluation, which decreases the practicality of this work.
Zawoad et al. proposed FAIoT, a forensic-aware eco-system
to collect forensic data from IoT platforms [36]. FAIoT
presents a general platform to collect forensic data in a
systematic way and organizes data for further analysis. One
shortcoming of this work is that there is no implementation
of data analysis as part of the framework. Chung et al. pro-
posed a forensic framework to collect and analyze forensic
data in a IoT eco-system [37]. However, this solution is
limited to Amazon Alexa ecosystem.
2) Smart Data Logging: The idea of logging information
from smart devices and apps is not novel. Several previous
works have used this technique to have access to information
as a result of smart app executions. In fact, the most
popular IoT programming platforms provide the ways for
logging smart app data [38], [39], [40], [41]. Personalized
open-source solutions can also be found [42], [3]. In this
context, solutions like the proposed in [1] try to provide
a comprehensive analysis of smart apps and smart devices
logs for security purposes. In this work, the authors propose
a platform-centric approach that looks at activities from
smart apps for data provenance purposes. In this case,
although this work is instrumental, the analysis is limited to
consider the temporal relationship between devices and apps
events without considering compromised devices, essential
for forensic analysis.
3) IoTDots and Information Flow Analysis in IoT:
Recently, information flow analysis (IFA) has moved from
traditional research domains like android to IoT. For fairness,
we believe it is necessary to evaluate the differences between
IoTDots and some of the most popular IFA tools in the
market today. In general, IoTDots achieves the capabili-
ties of all the considered tools with high accuracy, low
overhead, but while considering a comprehensive forensic
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model that includes challenges related to careless users,
malicious users, malicious apps, and tampered devices. Ad-
ditionally, more than policy enforcement or data provenance
in IoT, IoTDots provides intelligence to match security
policies in smart environments with interactions between
smart apps, devices, and users. Table VI summarizes the
major differences between FlowFence [43], ContextIoT [44],
ProvThings [1], SaINT [12], and IoTDots. For clarity, we
used the analysis criteria similar to the one proposed in [1].
Then, we expanded the table features based on the IoTDots
contributions.
Compared to these prior works, IoTDots presents a
comprehensive solution that automatically collects/stores
forensically-relevant data from a smart environment con-
sidering (1) the interaction between users, devices, and
apps inside the smart environment and (2) the security
policies defined for every different environment. Additionally,
our framework provides the means to analyze this data
and detect anomalous activities from users and malicious
behavior from users, smart apps, and devices. IoTDots flags
those activities and behaviors that potentially violate the
security policies of the smart environment and may help
to hold the perpetrators accountable in a holistic manner
during forensic investigations.
IX. CONCLUSIONS
Smart devices and sensors deployed in smart environ-
ments have access to data that can be used for foren-
sic purposes. Nonetheless, current smart app programming
platforms do not provide any digital forensic capability
to keep track of such information. Additionally, current
forensic analysis solutions do not use information from
smart apps and/or smart devices to perform forensic in-
vestigations. In this work, we introduce IoTDots, a novel
framework used to extract forensically-relevant logs from
smart apps and automatically analyze them later for foren-
sic purposes. The framework has two main components:
IoTDots-Modifier and IoTDots-Analyzer. The Modifier per-
forms smart apps’ source code analysis, detects forensically-
relevant data points inside the smart app’s source code, and
inserts specific logs at compile time. Then, at runtime, the
logs are sent to a remote IoTDots server. In a case of a
forensic investigation, the Analyzer applies data processing
and machine learning techniques to extract valuable and
usable forensic information from the IoTDots logs. As
per the evaluation results, IoTDots achieves over 98% of
accuracy on detecting user activities and over 96% accuracy
on detecting the behavior of users and smart apps in the
smart environment. Additionally, IoTDots performs with
very minimal to no overhead on the smart devices tested
and very low overhead to the IoT cloud server resources.
Finally, we have made IoTDots-Modifier available online.
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